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I have entitled my talk "Transnational Enterprises and
International Codes of Conduct: Introductory Remarks For
Experts" and I particularly emphasize "Introductory
Remarks For Experts," because I recognize that assembled
here are persons of the highest competence who have
studied the subject of TNE Codes of Conduct, and indeed
have been giving thought and reflection to the meaning and
impact of those codes on the real affairs and transactions
with which you are personally involved. I do not intend to
insult your intelligence and your experience with an
elementary introduction of the subject we will be
discussing today and tomorrow. Rather, what I will say now
assumes a relatively high level of expertise, and thus my
title: "Introductory Remarks For Experts."
This is one of the few times when there has been
assembled to discuss an important subject of government
policy such a distinguished group of private practitioners
who can bring to bear the experience of day-to-day
confrontation of the practicalities of that subject. Your
preparatory committee has given you a brilliant analytical
framework consisting of an outline and a series of
questions. You have also structured yourself into a series of
functional committees. These efforts, it seems to me, ensure
the success of your endeavor to shed light on a troublesome
subject.
While not repeating or duplicating the efforts of your
preparatory committee, I want to do four things in my
introductory remarks this afternoon, in hopes that my
comments can assist you in your endeavors and your
reflections, both now and in the future.
First, I want to speak briefly about the setting of world
economic and geopolitical environment in which we all
operate. In doing this I will be mostly stating some
reminders about this environment, of which most of you are
' aware. Basically I am asking, what is it about the present
world environment that has given rise to the recent surge of
international activity designed to control or regulate the
TNE, and why is the activity focused on the TNE? In short, I
ask: "What is the fuss all about?"
Secondly, I want to focus briefly on the efforts to
formulate codes, and why certain world institutions or
groups seem to think that this approach can be productive to
help in solving problems they perceive to exist. In short, I
ask: "What are the objectives of the code-makers?"
Third, I will turn attention to some major common or
general issues of the code efforts themselves. I do not
intend, nor do I have the time, to examine individual codes
in these introductory remarks. But I want to briefly mention
some of the basic pro and con arguments pertaining to
several overriding or pervasive issues that come up in the
context of most of the codes, including the extraordinarily
controversial issue of the techniques of implementing the
codes.
Fourth, and finally, I want to narrow my focus even a
little more, and in connection with the particular analytical
outline which you have been given to structure your
discussions, I want to make several comments and suggest
some questions.
I.

The Setting or Environment

Let me first, then, turn to the world environment. In many
ways I see the attention being currently focused on the TNE
as a tribute to the success of the TNE's in that environment.
Interdependence and the Declining Sovereignty of the
Nation State

A.

It is almost a cliche today to talk of the growing
interdependence of the world, yet there is almost no other
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way to express as well what is happening. This trend was
brought forcefully home to me several years ago when I was
in India. While visiting Calcutta I had occasion to converse
with businessmen there and to ask about the general
economic conditions. I was told at that time that the single
most important factor then influencing the economy of
Calcutta was the state of the U.S. market for starts of new
housing. My surprise must have been evident, so my hosts
explained that the major product of that area was "jute,"
that jute was then used extensively for carpet backing,
particularly in the installation of new carpeting, and that
this business in turn depended on the building of new
homes, principally in the United States. Since housing starts
in the U.S. depend heavily on the prevailing interest rate
for borrowed funds, one can see that U.S. government
monetary policy can have a profound influence on the well
being of people half-way around the globe.
For many years, Canada, the U.S. neighbor to the north,
has said that when the U.S. economy sneezes, Canada
catches cold. Another analogy used is that Canada's
relations with the U.S. are like a mouse trying to sleep in the
same bed as an elephant-it cannot, obviously, indulge
itself in a deep sleep knowing the consequences when its
bed-mate rolls over!
Today the United States also finds that its actions are
circumscribed by the interdependent world environment.
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Its own dependence on exports is rising, and its security is
intimately affected by decisions elsewhere on the globe.
The European Common Market-as the largest trading
entity in the world-has an influence on the world economy
that has not yet been matched by its capacity for leadership,
and this, too, is posing perplexing problems. Japan's
growing economic strength is also evident and its actions
also greatly impinge on others. Other parts of the world,
most especially the oil-producing areas, are profoundly
affecting others.
How did this increasing interdependence come about?
Perhaps the technological innovations of the post-World
War II era would have, at least in the absence of major
military fighting, created these conditions. The time and
cost of transport has fallen rapidly, so that this barrier to
greater trade flows and service exchanges has also
dropped. Communications have become spectacularly
instantaneous-we watch local wars in our living rooms on
the T.V. news by satellite, and it is possible now to order
goods or shift huge sums of money across oceans, literally in
seconds. Information systems are changing the character of
markets, and also affecting business techniques such as the
control of inventories, the use of borrowed money, the
response to changing interest rates, and the adoption of new
developments of technology. But these scientific
developments could not have had the influence they have
had if governments resisted them, as indeed can be
witnessed in the case of those governments that do resist
them.
20

We must recognize that the international institutions
erected or reinstated by governments after World War II
have made their contribution also (and indeed it is in the
context of many of those institutions that the codes of
conduct for TNE's are being developed). If some world
organizations (perhaps all) have failed to peform in the
manner contemplated, nevertheless, they have contributed
symbiotically to the general trend of the world environment
made possible by the scientific innovations. This is
particularly the case with the economic institutions.
The 1944 Bretton-Woods Conference launched the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In the next few
years the attempt to add a complementary organization for
trade , the ill-fated ITO of the Havana Charter, failed, but
into the vacuum grew the GATT-the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade. These institutions were later joined
by others, including the OECD, UNCTAD, and some
important regional systems. By the late 1960's, therefore, the
liberalization of trade and financial flows promoted by this
post war system-sometimes broadly called the BrettonWoods System-had progressed far enough to experience
an unprecedented surge of trade and to demonstrate the
economic benefits that flow from such liberalization. But at
the same time, new problems were emerging. The receding
of the waters of tariff and other overt protection inevitably
uncovers the rocks and shoals of a variety of non-tariff
barriers and other problems. As the European Economic
Community has in recent decades experienced, creating
free trade requires attention to a group of interrelated
activities such as the flow of capital, the flow of labor, the
flow of technology and services, and these in turn
revolutionize the methods of how governments have
traditionally controlled such matters as fiscal and monetary
policy, taxation structure , environment regulation; product
• standards, and liability for product defects. The propensity
for government summit meetings, both within the European
region and on a broader world-wide basis, is obviously not
unrelated to these world economic trends of
interdependence. Likewise, the attempts by governments to
join efforts through international organizations is a similar
result. The question is not whether a government will play
on the international scene, the questions are : Where will it
play and with whom, i.e. what forum will it work in, and
which other governments is it willing to let into its "club"?
The basic problem is that despite all the talk about
sovereignty, independence, and equality of nations, these
concepts are fictions if used to describe today's real world.
What is the sovereignty of the government of a country
whose trade is so dependent on a neighbor that the
government cannot freely set its own interest rate or tax
structure? What is the so-called independence of a
government whose national economy depends almost
entirely on one export commodity? What is the equality of
nations when one has hundreds of millions of inhabitants
while another has less than a million, when one has an
economy measured in trillions of dollars while another has
a total economic product less than that of a major (or even
minor) corporation operating from a base in the other
country?
Some would say it is best that sovereignty is no longer so
complete, that governments have not shown themselves
particularly fit to exercise the powers and responsibilities
which sovereignty implies, and that therefore the cold
reality cf the international economic environment is a
welcome restraint on misconceived and misapplied
governmental policies. Yet regardless of one's sympathy for
such a viewpoint, it is impossible to ignore the frustration
which governments face today, be they good governments
or bad governments; be they despotic governments, or
democratic; be they rational, or irrational. Even the rational
benevolent democratic government (both large and small)

finds it difficult to carry out its mandate on behalf of its
citizens. Cleaning up the environment is hard when smoke
drifts from your neighbor and the ocean becomes oil
covered. Providing citizen desired full employment is
difficult when economic down-turns starting in other
countries spread to your own. Establishing even your
democratically voted tax system becomes difficult if that
system is perceived as less advantageous to investors who
can take their money to other nations who are willing to bid
for their favors.
Two centuries ago, sovereignty might have enabled a
government to carry out a national goal even democratically
arrived at, for example, to exalt a particular religion, or to
give extraordinary rewards to persons of artistic or musical
talent. In today's world of mobile resources and mobile
people, what government can keep the doctors at home
when another nation pays much more? What government
can tax to promote equality or greater government services,
when other locations bid for talent? Without judging the
validity or correctness of the policies themselves, it is easy
to see how a government can be frustrated.
Indeed, interdependence has some potential large prices
to pay, even though it has brought and should continue to
bring great benefits. Two such prices can be mentioned:
The price of uniformity, and the price of the growing
remoteness of government decision-making. As to the first,
interdependence based on a set of international rules under
the Bretton-Woods System, imposes serious pressures on a
government to "harmonize" many of its policies with other
governments. Governments realize, for example, the selfdefeating nature of competitive interest rates , competitive
export finance programs, or competitive currency
devaluation. Thus a rational approach is to coordinate , to
harmonize. The price is less diversity, and less freedom to
go in your own direction.
The same pressures are leading to greater
internationalization of government decisions whether we
like it or not. Governments, not without reason, have been
very slow to entrust international institutions with much
concrete decision making power. Yet we have just seen
completed the elaborate Tokyo Round of Trade Negotiation
in the context of GATT that has brought to the international
scene new legal obligations on certain governments,
concerning even their own governmental purchasing
procedures, concerning their methods of establishing safety
and other standards of products, and concerning their use
of tax or regulatory measures which may affect the
competitive nature of their exports. A key question for the
future is one which I sometimes call essentially the
"federalism" question; i.e. how can the necessary
advantages of centralized coordination and decision
making be obtained in the world, while at the same time
reserving for the smallest possible unit of government, the
decision making authority which it needs to be responsive
to its constituents to whom it is closest.
B.

The Transnational Enterprise and Its Role

In this world interdependent environment has developed
the genius of the transnational enterprise. Existing in an
infinite variety of structures and forms, attracting
extraordinary talent by using extraordinary rewards, and
imposing a discipline that many governments seem only
able to dream about, the TNE has, not surprisingly, been
enormously successful in capitalizing on and contributing to
the advantages which the international environment and
the Bretton-Woods System have fostered. A TNE has
developed the "all-European" car, assembled from parts
produced all over Europe. Perhaps next will come the
"world car." A large TNE with manufacturing facilities in
several major world locations is often in a position to

quickly shift production from one facility to the next, to take
advantage of fast changing economic conditions including
shifting exchange rates. Such an enterprise has
opportunities for minimizing its total world-wide tax
liability through creative structures of its business, and the
TNE often has market information through its own direct
involvement in a number of different markets, or from its
expertise in taking advantage of available information.
(Indeed I am reminded of a conversation I had in Brazil
several years ago with a newsman who was incensed at the
alleged fact that a U.S. government satellite was assembling
information which was useful in predicting Brazilian crop
potential, and that this information was allegedly used by
some large U.S. corporations to speculate on world
commodity markets to the disadvantage of Brazil. When it
was pointed out to him that the U.S. government normally
takes great care in being sure that crop information is
available to all members of the public at the same time, and
that if such satellite information existed.it was probably
available to Brazilians, including Brazilian Embassy
personnel in Washington, his answer was: "Yes, but we
don't have the personnel capable of processing and
interpreting this satelite data!")
Indeed, the access and control over information, as well
as the capability to transmit information (such as new
technology), is considered by some to be one of the major
80
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advantages of the well managed TNE.
As is often the case, however, success brings prominence
and power, and with that come reactions from groups that
are jealous; groups that feel rightly or wrongly that they are
suffering because of the TNE success, and groups who are
in competition for power. In short, the success of the TNE
makes it a target.
But there are also some legitimate worries about the
success and power of the TNE . One doesn't need to search
far for some dramatic horror stories: the TNE which
produced the defective imported product which maims or
kills, yet is not reachable for any remedy for the victim; the
TNE subsidiary that evades its local responsibilities by
pulling out, perhaps in a bankruptcy situation; the TNE that
avoids commitments to its labor force by "going off shore";
and worse, the TNE that actively engages in corrupt
practices to co-opt local governments and power elites.
Even apart from these more dramatic cases, there are a
number of troubling situations where the borderlines of
sound policy or good citizenship are very unclear.
Behind all this lurks a troubling fact for the TNE's:
governments differ widely in their views about the role of
enterprises in society. Some governments view the
corporation or other enterprise form as essentially a
facilitative structure to promote the private, usually profit
making, goals of the individuals who have formed the
structure. In their view the public good is advanced by
allowing such business structures lo enhance and release
the individual motivations for gain in the free market place,
21

so that Adam Smith's "invisible hand" plays its role for
greater productivity and efficiency in creating goods and
services for society. Other governments, however, view the
enterprise form as merely an extension of the state, a sort of
quasi-government bureau, to advance governmental goals,
be they what they may. Many governments fall inbetween.
Even in relatively free market oriented societies, however,
observers have noted that governments view the
corporation as one technique of control and facilitation for
broader government goals, even when such goals are not
consistent with the private profit motive. For example ,
books have been written suggesting that the French
government often takes this view of its corporations.
Probably no government is immune from these temptations.
The United States government, in recently freezing Iranian
assets, explicitly relied upon American Bank Corporations
to carry its freeze policy into foreign territory. Likewise,
U.S. government attempts to ensure that its corporations'
subsidiaries abroad assist in carrying out its export control
policy, are well known.
These considerations lead one to notice at least three
fundamental questions or issues about the rule '!nd function
of the TNE in today's interdependent world:
First, given the wide diversity of viewpoints among
governments as to the role of the TNE in society, there
constantly exists the danger that a particular TNE will be
80
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subject to conflicting governmental policies, if not
downright inconsistent regulations.
Second, given the re-occurring history of governmental
enlistment or attempts to enlist TNE's in the service of one
or another of their policy goals, other governments and
their citizens, hosts of the foreign TNE, would seem to have
the legitimate right to ask such enterprises which goals are
they pursuing and are such foreign government goals
compatible with their own policies?
Third, and perhaps more fundamental, governments may
appropriately ask with respect to many specific situations,
whether the classical profit motivation of the centralized
TNE leadership itself, viewing the TNE as a whole, is
compatible in all cases with the particular goals of a host
society.
II. Controlling the TNE's and the Development of Codes
A . Actions by National Governments

The circumstances and concerns mentioned above lead
governments naturally to seek ways to overcome the
difficulties posed to them. In some cases governments,
particularly those like the United States which feels in a
relatively (albeit waning) powerful position, have tried to
act unilaterally in ways to reach transnational behavior.
The United States governmental and court extension of
anti-trust liability to actions outside its own borders, is
widely known and indeed, widely disliked, invoking major

22

counteractions by other governments. Likewise, other forms
of government regulation may have an "extra-territorial
reach." Tax authorities have been particularly pressed to
preserve their tax base, and this has led to special laws
reshuffling accounting figures, or introducing so-called
"unitary" systems of taxation.
In some cases governments find that their efforts will
cancel each other out, and so an international solution is
sought, either bilateral or multilateral. Most international
action, however, has been designed to place mutually
agreed limitations on government activity, while only
indirectly affecting private enterprises. Thus the CATT
restricts governmental activity designed to impose
restrictions on trade across borders. The International
Monetary Fund aims to limit certain types of governmental
activity regarding exchange rates and exchange markets,
which could be damaging to the world economy.
Although not unique or totally original, the growth in
recent years of efforts to develop internationally agreed
limitations which bear more directly on the TNE is
certainly a new turn of events. What is remarkable is the
large number and diversity of these efforts, a virtual "code
proliferation." It is these efforts which we examine in detail
today and tomorrow. My comments so far in this paper have
been designed primarily to set these efforts in the broader
perspective of the current geopolitical-economic system.

Although the code effort proliferation is an
understandable and perhaps predictable result of the
various forces and trends which I have outlined above,
there is plenty of cause for concern about the way these
efforts are being conducted. Let me focus for a moment, on
• just one fairly fundamental aspect of these efforts.
It is possible to detect in the various code efforts a variety
of goals or objectives. It is certain that some of these goals or
objectives conflict with others, and this fact poses some
important implications. Let me just list some of the goals
which I think I can detect in these various efforts, although
some of these are by no means made explicit. I will leave it
to you to determine the consistency or inconsistency of
these diverse objectives:
1) First, one can see a goal of equalizing the competitive
environment for TNE's based in diverse societies. For
example, U.S. corporations which face extra-ordinarily
complex and far reaching U.S. government statutory and
regulatory rules regarding bribery, or corporate disclosure,
would like to see their principal competitors abroad subject
to similar rules.
2) A number of governmental representatives seem very
interested in designing international rules which will
preserve or restore a measure of national government
independence of action in choosing domestic policies. Thus,
there is an interest in establishing rules that might diminish
the degree of TNE involvement in the host political and
governmental processes.
3) Some governments see the code efforts as offering the
possibility to enlist the TNE as a tool of national
governmental policy, such as a policy of fostering economic
development in developing countries, or in underdeveloped regions of industrial countries.
4) Similarly, some developing country representatives
seem to view the code drafting efforts as part of a broader
initiative to shift the terms of international economic
bargaining power to be more favorable to the developing
nations of the world.
5) Some code draftsmen seem to see the code as a useful
device to further social reforms within their own (or other)
societies, such as reforms that promote income or welfare
redistribution, or union bargaining power.

6) Similarly, another goal of some code proponents is a
general moral or policy goal of preventing certain TNE
actions generally deemed to be abusive and immoral. such
as bribery, tax evasion, or practices which defraud the
public.
7) Likewise, the perceived need for better transnational
regulation of anti-competitive bel:iavior is a motivating goal
for some.
8) Some code proponents simply feel that the certainty or
predictability of code rules can be valuable, reducing the
risk to enterprise management of post hoc moral or
regulatory judgments, and reducing the risk premium of, for
example, international investment flows.
9) Finally (but this list is certainly not exhaustive). the
codes are seen by some as opportunities to piggy-back
certain rules or definitions long sought by other means.
Thus rules sought for fair compensation for expropriation
become part of the bargaining context of code formulation .

C.

has been so ably pointed out, no one should be fooled by the
seeming informality of a "voluntary" code or set of
guidelines. Even these can have considerable impact,
attract the sanction at least of public opinion, and influence
national or international courts or other government
officials.
Formal legal adoption of a code, such as through a
binding treaty, may in fact prove politically impossible to
accomplish ; thus the attraction of less formal means. But
carefully crafted informal institutions of "surveillance" can
often make the voluntary code as effective as that which is
legally binding. The risk is that the informality of proposed
implementation may induce some to-be-affected parties to
relax their attention to the code formulating process. The
reception by the arbitrator in the 1977 Texaco (TOPCO)Libyan oil case of certain language of a U.N. General
Assembly Resolution demonstrates the impact that nonlegally binding international consensus documents can
have in some circumstances.

The Perils of Code Formulation

Since no single agency has a monopoly on code
formulation, and since there exists such a wide range of
goals and objectives, clearly one danger is the emergence of
codes which conflict with each other, either explicitly or
implicitly. The different forums for code discussions have
different balance of interests, different voting procedures,
and respond to different priorities among the goals.
Furthermore, as I have mentioned before, there is often
no agreement in the world on certain fundamental issues,
such as the desirable structure for a national economy, the
degree of distribution of income and wealth which is fair , or
the importance of the protection of private property rights.
Thus code formulation often runs aground on the shoals of
these fundamental disagreements.
The challenge, at least for the near future, is to develop
an understanding of the policies involved and to design
code rules for those portions of those policies which do
seem to command agreement or compromise consensus, so
that some of the advantages which a code can bring can be
soon realized. On the other hand, the challenge is also to
avoid irreversible commitment to code rule words which
could be soon outdated, or which reflect such studied
ambiguity in the face of fundamental disagreement that
such code words will engender conflict rather than help to
resolve it.
III. Some Major Common Issues of the Codes
Although the issues encountered in the various code
drafting exercises are not always the same, there do seem to
arise in a number of these efforts certain major general
problems. I want to discuss, briefly, four such problems,
which I am sure will engage your attention during the next
several days. In some cases I will mention some of the
policy arguments which are relevant to each of these issues,
although I feel certain that you will be able in your
discussions to suggest more.
1) Implementation and Adoption

The question of how to adopt or implement the code
arises in a number of the yet uncompleted code drafting
efforts, and has had to be faced in connection with those
codes already approved. It seems clear in these debates
over implementation that participants' views of the
substance of the proposed rules greatly affect their views
about implementation. Potential alternatives range from
the promulgation of a code as merely a "morally
persuasive" set of principles, to a set of legally binding
rules established in domestic or international law. Yet, as

2) Scope of a Code's Reach

What type of enterprises should be covered by a
proposed code of conduct? Considerable attention has been
devoted to this issue, particularly regarding enterprises
owned by a government. Those. who urge that coverage
.---...
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include all types of enterprises, government owned or not,
domestic host country corporations as well as foreign
corporations, have on their side the arguments of equal
treatment and reciprocity. On the other hand, some of the
goals sought to be achieved by a code (as outlined in II
above) could lead one to a contrary conclusion.
3) International Law Principles, National Treatment, and
Expropriation Comp:ensation

This issue could be called "linking." The basic goal of
some code formulators is that if a code contains rules
obligating foreign TNE's operating in a host country, that
the host country should reciprocate by undertaking
obligations also. The two prime candidates for such
reciprocal obligations seem to be national treatment, and
the rule of prompt, adequate and effective compensation
for expropriation of private property. Reciprocity
encourages the idea that code proponents not be allowed to
obtain something for nothing, that is, that reciprocal
obligations encourage a sense of responsibility. Likewise,
the proponents of reciprocity may in fact be uninterested in
a code which one-sidedly obligates only the TNE, and see in
the code effort an opportunity to promote other rules longdesired by them. On the other hand, it isn't logically
necessary that linkage occur. A code might enhance certain
goals, such as predictability, or evening out the competitive
environment for TNE's even if no "linkage" occurs. Some
who make linkage a sine quo non may simply recognize that
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the proposed reciprocal rules are so unacceptable that
imposing them as a condition is a way to defeat the code
proposal generally.

for choosing certain techniques and for rejecting others, in
connection with each code .
B. The Role of the Lawyer

4) New Rules, Amendments, and Code Evolution

One troublesome aspect of many code endeavors is the
lack of adequate and effective means to change the code
rules when they become outmoded or are shown to be
defective. The GATT experience is testimony to what
happens when an amendment or new rule procedures turns
out to be basically unworkable-some GATT rules have
become painfully out of date, but the amending procedure
has basically been unworkable. One possible advantage of
a voluntary code or guideline approach, of course, is to
avoid the rigidities which a legal rule might have. But even
voluntary rules can become outdated. Indeed because they
were drafted as voluntary, the draftsmen often overlook the
need for including in them a system for keeping the rules
fresh and up to date.
To launch a set of rules for TNE behavior at a time of
great controversy over many fundamental issues about the
purpose and proper function of TNE's is particularly risky
unless effective review and revision is built in. Some codes
purport to have procedures, but if change requires
"unanimity" or "consensus" those procedures could
become as unusable as those of the GATT. Once fixed, the
code words become very hard to revise. Perhaps a term of
years should be specified in each code, after which any
governmental party could, on due notice, declare itself no
longer bound by the code (as a way to bring pressure for the
revision of the rules). When a set of rules loses its consensui;
support, it also tends to lose effectiveness or compliance. In
such a case the rules can become traps for the unwary or
inexperienced, engendering conflict, and promoting
instability.
IV.
A.

And now let me conclude with a question which may be
simply worded and deceptively ordinary sounding, but
which has layers upon layers of implications for us in the
international legal profession and for our clients and
employers, that is:
Should the Multinational Enterprises we know, develop
and pursue their own philosophy of foreign affairs, and if
so, what is the appropriate role of the attorney in helping
develop that philosophy?

Some Directions for Discussions on the Codes

Comments on the Codes and Rules

Your committee's outline and questions should provide
an excellent framework for your various committee
discussions on the codes today and tomorrow. Let me
simply add a few points that could help focus your work.
Think about just what you would like to see in the overall
report of this conference, as to the codes for TNE's. For
example, are any of the following questions to be answered
in the report:
1) A definitive statement for or against the promulgation
of each of the particular codes. Do you want to say explicitly
"yes" to Code A; "no" to Code B, etc.
2) Or do you prefer not to pass judgment so explicitly, and
if not, would you like to say as to each particular code, that
it is acceptable if (and perhaps only if) a list of changes
from the current draft be accepted and incorporated into
the code.
3) Do you prefer an even less explicit approach, and
instead want merely to state as to each code its strengths
and its weaknesses, with an indication of changes proposed
to eliminate its weaknesses.
4) In any case, particularly valuable to governments and
the world community would be carefully formulated
constructive statement of reasons for your conclusions,
when possible giving precise case histories of situations to
illustrate your points from your own experience. It is this
type of evidence that could be the major contribution of this
conference.
5) Finally, you could give your views on the techniques or
modes for implementing each code, indicating the reasons
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Underlying your activity, of course, is a series of issues
fundamental to the rule of the lawyer or legal professional.
So that we do not overlook these issues, or assume
unexamined choices as to these issues, let me try to
articulate some of them:
1) What is the appropriate role of the attorney regarding
the issues involved in the codes of conduct?
2) Can he separate his own views from those of his client
or employer?
3) If his views differ from those of his client or employer,
in what situations, if any, is he entitled or obligated to make
these differences known?
4) What role should the attorney play in presenting
arguments of his view to his client or employer? How much
freedom does he have in practice in this regard?
5) How do the roles of attorneys in different cultures, for
example in the U.S. as contrasted with Europe, differ in
regard to the questions above?
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